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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
SUCCESSOR STATES-PROPERTY RIGHTS-RUSSIA AND
UKRAINE AGREE TO SHARE CONTROL OF THE FORMER
SOVIET UNION'S BLACK SEA FLEET
I. FACTS
On December 8, 1991, Russia, Byelorussia, and Ukraine formed
the Commonwealth of Independent States and declared the termi-
nation of the Soviet Union as a legal and political entity. ' The creation
of the Commonwealth marked the culmination of two years of internal
turmoil in the Soviet Union,2 and by December 21, 1991, eight more
republics had joined the CIS.' The Soviet Union formally ceased to
I The Commonwealth of Independent States [hereinafter CIS] is an alliance of
fully independent states intending to develop their relations based on mutual rec-
ognition of and respect for each republic's equal rights and sovereignty. Agreement
Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States, Dec. 8, 1991, reprinted in
U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess. at 2, U.N. Doc. A/46/771 (1991), reprinted in 31 I.L.M.
143, 148 [hereinafter CIS Agreement]. CIS policy is to be determined by coordinating
bodies, such as the Council of Heads of State (comprised of the heads of the eleven
member republics). Agreement on Coordinating Bodies of the Commonwealth of
Independent States, Dec. 21, 1991, reprinted in Annex IV, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess.
at 7, U. N. Doc. A/47/60 (1991), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 150 [hereinafter CIS
Coordinating Bodies Agreement]. Russia, Ukraine, and Byelorussia withdrew from
the Soviet Union, prompting its demise, because of severe economic and political
conditions. For an in depth analysis of events compelling the dissolution of the
USSR, see Patricia Lee Dorff, Chronology of 1991; The Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe, 71 FOR. AFF. 195 (1992).
2 In April of 1991, retail prices on many goods and services in the USSR rose
as much as fivefold because of Soviet President Gorbachev's scheduled relaxation
of state controls on the Soviet economy. Dorff, supra note 1. Political discontent
prompted several republics to declare independence from the Soviet Union. For
example, on March 11, 1990, the Lithuanian parliament declared independence; on
August 19, 1991, the Estonian parliament declared independence; and on August
21, 1991, the Latvian parliament declared independence. Soviet Union Disbands,
Replaced by Commonwealth; Gorbachev Resigns, Ending Historic Era, WORLD NEWS
Di., Dec. 31, 1991, at Al. On August 19, 1991 a group of right-wing Soviets,
denouncing Gorbachev's proposed Union Treaty, seized power one day before Russia,
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were due to sign the Treaty. By August 21, 1991, the
Coup collapsed, destroying the conservative, unionist caucus at the center of Soviet
politics. Id. Thus, the foundation was laid for the demise of the Soviet Union.
I Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Mol-
dova, and Turkmenistan are the other eight members of the CIS. CIS Agreement,
supra note 1, at 147.
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exist when Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev resigned on December
25, 1991. 4
The new Commonwealth is not a successor state to the former
Soviet Union but a confederation of independent republics.5 Although
the Commonwealth members have reached numerous agreements con-
cerning their alliance, they failed to reach an agreement on unified
control of conventional armed forces and permitted each republic to
maintain their own forces. 6 Consequently, Russia and Ukraine began
4 Gorbachev's critics discredited Gorbachev and his liberalizing reforms by blam-
ing the reforms for the Soviet Union's political and economic problems. For more
information on Gorbachev's resignation, see Robert G. Kaiser, Gorbachev: Triumph
and Failure, 70 FOR. AFF. 161 (1991).
1 The Commonwealth is not a successor state to the Soviet Union because it is
not a state since it does not have a government, parliament, constitution, central
bank, or any enforcement mechanism to implement its decisions. Dimitri K. Simes,
America and the Post-Soviet Republics, 71 FOR. AFF. 73, 74 (1992). In order to
qualify as a state, an entity must have: (1) a permanent population; (2) a defined
territory; (3) a government; and (4) a capacity to enter into relations with other
states. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Nov. 2, 1933,
art. 1, 49 Stat. 3097, 3099, 165 L.N.T.S. 19, 21. Furthermore, the CIS Agreement
designated neither the Commonwealth nor any one of the eleven CIS republics as
the sole successor state to the Soviet Union. CIS Agreement, supra note 1. Since
relations between the republics were to be developed on the basis of equality,
presumably all eleven republics share the status of successor states to the Soviet
Union. The world,.however, has recognized Russia as the unofficial, sole successor
state, since Russia has the most people, industry, and military assets of all the
republics, John T. Correll, Russia and the Eleven Dwarfs, 33 Am FORCE MAG. 2,
3 (1992), and because Russia succeeded to the former Soviet seat on the U.N. Security
Council. Decision by the Council of Heads of State of the Commonwealth of
Independent States, Dec. 21, 1991, reprinted in Annex V, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess.
at 8, U.N. Doc. A/47/60 (1991), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 151 [hereinafter Decision
by Heads of State Council]. Ukraine, however, has the potential to challenge Russia's
position as the de facto successor to the Soviet Union. Ukraine is Europe's second
largest state in terms of territory and possesses Europe's second largest armed forces.
Ukraine is also a major agricultural and industrial center in the CIS. Adrian Kar-
atnycky, The Ukrainian Factor, 71 FOR. AFF. 90 (1992).
6 CIS members agreed that Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus (formerly Byelorussia)
would retain their memberships in the United Nations, with Russia assuming the
Soviet seat on the U.N. Security Council. Decision by Heads of State Council, supra
note 5. CIS members also agreed to honor the Soviet Union's arms control com-
mitments and debt and treaty obligations. CIS Agreement, supra note 1, at 143.
CIS members agreed to unified control over strategic forces and after failing to
agree on unified command of conventional forces, decided to permit each republic
to maintain conventional armed forces. Agreement on Joint Measures with Respect
to Nuclear Weapons, Dec. 21, 1991, reprinted in Annex VI, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess.
at 9, U.N. Doc. A/47/60 (1991), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 152. Ukraine strongly
opposed unified control of conventional armed forces, since it wanted its own military
force to support its quest for independence as a sovereign state.
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to develop their own navies, and tensions soon developed between
them over who would assume command of the former Soviet Black
Sea Fleet stationed on the Crimean peninsula in Ukraine.7 On August
3, 1992, Russia and Ukraine agreed to a transitional period of joint
control of the Fleet until 1995.8 While this Agreement may have eased
Russian-Ukrainian tensions over Fleet control, it generates further
problems by postponing the determination of the true successor state
to the Soviet Union9 and by undermining the stability of the CIS in
the interim.'0
I The Black Sea warm water port is a strategic entry point to Europe. Russian
geopolitical influence in the Mediterranean, Middle East, and the African Horn
would be diminished without control of this naval branch. Bohdan S. Kordan, The
Tussle between Ukraine and Russia over the Black Sea Fleet is Just the Beginning,
TORONTO STAR, Jan. 14, 1992, at A13. The Fleet itself has over 300 vessels, including
28 submarines, 46 major surface ships, and 150 combat aircraft. Peter Adams,
Disputes over Military Threaten to Split Commonwealth, DEF. NEWS, Feb. 10, 1992,
at A28. Ukraine claims control of the Fleet under the CIS Agreement because the
Fleet is not a strategic force subject to unified control since it does not carry nuclear
weapons. Id. Ukraine also claims ownership because the Fleet is located on its
territory and the Fleet's shipyards account for 40 percent of all shipbuilding in the
former Soviet Union. Peter Adams, Ukraine Strides Uneasily on Road to Self
Sufficiency, DEF. NEWS, Feb. 17, 1992, at A34. Russia defines "strategic" more
broadly and claims control because the Fleet is strategic since it counters U.S.
influence on the Mediterranean. Id.
The fight over the Fleet also involves the question of who controls Crimea since
the Fleet is based on the Crimean Peninsula. In 1954, former Soviet President
Khrushchev gave the Crimean peninsula (a part of Russia) to Ukraine to celebrate
the 300th anniversary of the union between Ukraine and Russia. At that point in
time, the shift in jurisdiction was insignificant because of the centralized Kremlin
rule. Malcolm Gray, A Crimean Crisis, MACLEAN'S, May 25, 1992, at B20. In an
attempt to re-gain control of Crimea and the Black Fleet, the Russian parliament
recently proclaimed the 1954 transfer invalid since it was never recorded. Ukraine
maintains it is the legitimate owner of the Fleet, as the 1954 transfer was valid.
Rutskoi Claims Crimea for Mother Russia, WASH. Tnuds, Aug. 8, 1992, at A2.
' Under this Agreement, the Fleet is taken out of the CIS joint armed forces
and is placed under the direct jurisdiction of the presidents of the Russian Federation
and Ukraine. Each Republic will recruit by conscription in equal measure, 50 percent
and 50 percent respectively. The servicemen called to serve during the transitional
period shall swear allegiance to the state of which they hold citizenship. By 1995,
Russia and Ukraine intend to develop a Russian Federation navy and naval forces
of Ukraine from the Black Sea Fleet basis. Text of Russian Ukrainian Agreement
on Black Sea Fleet, BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts, Aug. 8, 1992, at SU/
1454/C1/a, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBC file [hereinafter Black Sea Fleet
Agreement].
9 Although Russia has been recognized as the sole successor to the Soviet Union,
see supra note 5, the ultimate controller of the Black Sea Fleet will have an
opportunity to exert a great deal of influence in the Mediterranean. If Ukraine gains
control of the Fleet, Russia will have no warm water port in the Mediterranean and
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The emergence of successor states and their rights to the predecessor
state's property is a recurring controversy in the current international
arena." A succession of states is defined as "the replacement of one
State by another in the responsibility for the international relations
of territory.' 2 Under international law, the predecessor state's ca-
will lose its influence there. Consequently, Ukraine, not Russia could emerge as an
international player and replace Russia as the unofficial successor to the Soviet
Union. Kordan, supra note 7.
10 The Agreement undermines CIS stability because other republics were excluded
from Russia and Ukraine's decision to jointly control the Fleet, which all the republics
helped to develop and maintain. According to one CIS agreement, all the member
republics, acting through the Council of Heads of State, were to collectively determine
policy on matters of common interest. CIS Coordinating Bodies Agreement, supra
note 1.
1 For example, the reunification of Germany has posed problems for the new
German government concerning obligations to return private property to citizens
that was confiscated by the former East German Government. For more information
regarding the German Unification, see Dorothy Ames Jeffress, Resolving Rival Claims
on East German Property Upon German Unification, 101 YALE L.J. 527 (1991).
The formation of the CIS leaves uncertainty as to which republic, if any, is the
successor state to the Soviet Union and the legitimate commander of the Black Sea
Fleet.
12 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property,
Archives and Debts, Apr. 7, 1983, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.117/14 (1983), reprinted in
22 I.L.M. 306, 308 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The predecessor state is the
one that ceases to exist, and the successor state is the one that replaces it. Id. An
example of state succession is the 1963 dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia
and Nyasaland (the predecessor state) into the successor states of Zimbabwe, Zambia,
and Malawi (these three were treated equally after the dissolution; none was rec-
ognized as the sole successor state). For more information on the dissolution of the
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, see Sm ROLAND WELENSSKY, 4000 DAYS,
(1964).
A total succession of state occurs when the legal identity of the predecessor state
is completely destroyed by the successor state. D.P. O'CONNELL, LAW OF STATE
SUCCESSION 3 (1956). Because Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus announced the demise
of the Soviet Union's legal identity and formed a new, democratic confederation of
republics, a total succession of states most likely occurred with the creation of the
CIS (although the member republics, not the Commonwealth, are the successor states
to the Soviet Union).
International law distinguishes between the succession of states (which may create
a discontinuity in statehood) and the succession of governments (which leaves state-
hood unaffected). When a state ceases to exist, its rights and duties are terminated.
These rights and duties are not affected by a change in government. An example
of this distinction is the USSR after the 1917 October Revolution. Although the
new regime insisted that it was both a new state and a new government, other states
perceived it only as a new government and expected the new regime to honor the
obligations of the preceding one. JAMES CRAWFORD, Tim CREATION OF STATES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 405 (1979).
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pacities, property rights, and duties terminate with its statehood, and
the successor state gains the right to the predecessor's property. 13
A successor state's acquisition of its predecessor's property depends
upon international recognition of its status as the legitimate suc-
cessor. 14 A successor state may meet the de jure requirements for
statehood" but be reduced de facto to a non-state if the international
world does not accept it as a legitimate successor to the preceding
state.16 Consequently, several states may compete to gain recognition
11 When the successor state is a newly independent state, movable and immovable
State property of the predecessor State connected with the activity of the predecessor
State in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates shall pass
to the successor State. Vienna Conference, supra note 12, at 312. A newly independent
state means a successor state, the territory of which, immediately before the date
of the succession of states, was a dependent territory for the international relations
of which the predecessor State was responsible. Id. The property that the successor
receives, however, is public property. Public property is defined by three criteria:
(1) the public character it possesses by reason of its being governed by public law;
(2) the fact that it is not owned by a private person; and (3) the fact that it is for
the use of all the population. D. P. O'CONNELL, SUCCESSION OF STATES 144 (1970).
The dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland is an example of
successor States' appropriation of public property. The three newly independent
states of Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi agreed to equally divide the armed forces
among them and to jointly manage the former Federation's railway. For more
information, see WELENSKY, supra note 12.
14 A successor state will be recognized by the international community when it
has met the requirements of statehood (see supra text accompanying note 5) and
has lawfully succeeded the predecessor state. Third states (states other than the
successor and predecessor) are required by international law not to recognize successor
states who have unlawfully succeeded. Unlawful succession usually involves the
attainment by an entity of the characteristics of statehood or the acquisition of
territory in violation of the United Nations Charter. Vienna Conference, supra note
12, art. 3 at 308.
The country in which the public property of the predecessor is situated is not
obliged to acknowledge the pretensions of the successor unless it has recognized the
latter as the de jure sovereign. For example, the Emperor of Ethopia was denied
the right to recover money owed to his country by a British defendant because Great
Britain recognized Italy (who had annexed Ethopia) as the de jure successor and
the owner of the right to recover. Haile Selassie v. Cables and Wireless Limited,
reprinted in O'CONNELL, supra note 12, at 234.
"1 See supra note 5.
16 An example of the power of international non-recognition involves China and
Taiwan. After the 1949 Communist Revolution in China, the international community
(excluding the United States until January 1979) recognized the People's Republic
of China as the successor to the Kuomintang Government (in exile in Taiwan),
although the Kuomintang Government still claimed it was the legitimate government
of China. The international recognition of the People's Republic (exemplified by its
admission to the United Nations in 1971) legitimized its takeover of China, while
the non-recognition of the Kuomintang Government caused the regime to fade from
GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. [Vol. 22:659
as the legitimate successor, particularly when a federation of states
is dissolved. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the failure of
the CIS members to designate a successor state present a situation
ripe for a successor state struggle.
Ironically, the republics responsible for the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, Russia, Ukraine, and Byelorussia, also were responsible for
its creation in 1922.11 Under the Soviet Constitution, the Union, a
federation of the republics, possessed plenary powers leaving the
republics virtually powerless and dependent upon the federation for
their continued existence.' By the late 1980s, communism had proved
to be an unworkable system for the Soviet Union, and poor economic
conditions and national unrest prompted its dissolution. 19 Russia,
Ukraine, and Byelorussia again met to create a new federation, the
Commonwealth of Independent States. 20 The CIS was officially formed
the international arena. For an in depth analysis of Taiwan's international status,
see Leonard B. Boudin, The Effects of Derecognition and Government Succession
upon Locus Standi and Property Rights: The Kokario Case, 13 HASTINGS INT'L. &
Coup. L. REv. 205 (1990).
" These three republics created the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Konst.
SSSR art.1 (1924), reprinted in SOVIET GOVERNMENT: A SELECTION OF OFFICIAL
DOCUMENTS ON INTERNAL POLICY 51 (Mervyn Matthews ed., 1974).
11 The Soviet Constitution states that "the sovereignty of the member Republics
is limited only in matters indicated in the present constitution, as coming within the
competence of the Union. Outside of those limits, each member Republic exerts its
public powers independently." Id. at 54. The extensive powers reserved to the Union,
however, include: conducting international relations; organizing and directing the
armed forces of the Union; directing transportation and postal and telegraphic
services; and establishing a unitary monetary system. Id. at 53. The Republics thus
had little power independent from the federation. The Republics did have some
international participation, since Ukraine and Byelorussia, along with the Soviet
Union, were founding members of the United Nations, although they were not
permitted to conduct international relations independently of the Soviet Union.
Indeed, one author suggests that Ukrainian and Byelorussian membership in the
United Nations depended more upon their participation in World War II rather than
their status as independent, sovereign states. See CRAWFORD, supra note 12, at 133.
For more information on the charter members of the United Nations, see Robert
E. Riggs and Jack C. Piano, THE UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
AND WORLD POLITICS (1988).
The Soviet Constitution also states that "[tihe territory of the member republics
cannot be modified without their consent." U.S.S.R. CONST., supra note 17, art.
4 at 54. In 1954, however, Khrushchev gave Crimea, a part of the Russian republic,
to Ukraine, over Russian objections. Russia has recently questioned the constitu-
tionality of the Crimean transfer. Rutskoi Claims Crimea for Mother Russia, supra
note 7. Consequently, the Union appears to have had extensive powers despite the
language of the Constitution.
,9 See supra note 2.
20 Article 5 of the CIS Agreement states that "[t]he High Contracting Parties
19921 RussiA AND UKRAINE AGREE TO SHARE CONTROL 665
when eight other republics joined on December 21, 1991.21 Officially,
no republic has been designated as the sole successor state to the
Soviet Union and hence the legitimate owner of the former Soviet
Union's Black Sea Fleet. 22 Russia and Ukraine are currently embroiled
in a struggle to be recognized as the sole successor state to the Soviet
Union and to gain control of the Black Sea Fleet. 23
III. ANALYSIS
The Russian and Ukrainian Agreement to share control of the
Black Sea Fleet 24 circumvents the problem of ascertaining which re-
public is entitled to Fleet ownership as the sole successor to the Soviet
Union, thereby postponing the emergence of a true, sole successor
state to the Soviet Union until 1995.25 This Agreement is significant
because it threatens the stability of the CIS and the international
order 26
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the CIS republics qualify
as newly independent successor states under the terms of the Vienna
acknowledge and respect each other's territorial integrity and the inviolability of
existing borders within the Commonwealth." CIS Agreement, supra note 1, at 144.
Article 6 states that "[t]he States members of the Commonwealth will maintain,
and retain under joint command, a common military and strategic space, including
joint control over nuclear weapons, the procedure for implementing which will be
regulated by a special agreement." Id.
Article 7 states:"[tihe High Contracting Parties recognize that the sphere of their
joint activity, conducted on an equitable basis through common coordinating insti-
tutions of the Commonwealth embraces: coordination of foreign policy. . . ." Id.
Article 12 provides that "[tihe High Contracting Parties undertake to discharge
the international obligations incumbent on them under treaties and agreements entered
into by the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." Id. at 145.
21 See supra text accompanying notes 1-3, 6.
22 Although no sole successor is specifically designated, the world has accepted
Russia as the de facto successor because it retained the Soviet seat on the U.N.
Security Council. Ukraine and Belarus, however, also retained their seats on the
U.N., and these three republics openly have agreed to support membership for the
other CIS members in the United Nations. Decision by Heads of State Council,
supra note 5, at 151; See also supra text accompanying note 9.
23 See supra text accompanying note 9; See also CIS Agreement, supra note 1,
at 151.
24 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
23 The Russian/Ukrainian Agreement is of suspect validity under international
law. Neither Russia nor the Ukraine is the sole successor of the Fleet and entitled
to make an independent decision of its disposition. See supra text accompanying
note 12.26 See infra notes 40 and 47 and accompanying texts.
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Convention. 27 As newly independent successor states, they each are
entitled to ownership of the predecessor's movable public property
located in their territory. 21 Under international law, the Black Sea
Fleet satisfies the three requirements of state property to be inherited
by the successor states. 29 In previous circumstances where no sole
successor state was designated, the several successors have shared the
predecessor's public property equally.30 Russia and Ukraine, however,
have excluded the other successor states from controlling the Fleet
in the hopes that one of the two will emerge as the sole successor
to the Soviet Union. 31
Russia has asserted claims to the Fleet on the basis of its position
as the de facto sole successor state to the Soviet Union.3 2 Because
the Fleet is stationed on Ukrainian territory, Ukraine maintains that
it legitimately owns the Fleet, citing the CIS agreement of December
21, 1991 and the Act of Proclamation of Ukrainian Independence.33
21 As members of the USSR, the republics were dependent upon the Soviet Union
for all international relations. See supra text accompanying notes 13 and 18.
21 See supra text accompanying note 13.
" The Fleet is public property because it is governed by public law, not owned
by a private person, and utilized for the benefit of all the population. See supra
note 13.
The Fleet, however, involves more than a simple question of property to be claimed
by the successor state. The Fleet is stationed on the Crimean Peninsula in the
Ukraine. Khrushchev's gift of Crimea to Ukraine was insignificant in 1954 because
Crimea was still controlled by the Soviet Union. With the demise of the Soviet
Union and the creation of independent, sovereign states, Crimea is now controlled
by the Ukraine. The Russian Republic wants Crimea returned to its control and
recently declared Khrushchev's act giving Crimea to Ukraine as unconstitutional and
void, because it is unrecorded. The Crimeans, composed of ethnic minorities, long
for independence from Ukraine. Crimea recently declared its independence in May
1992, but later rescinded the proclamation after protests from Ukrainian nationalists.
The Ukraine has subsequently given Crimea latitude to set its own foreign economic
relations and social and cultural policies to forestall a fight over Crimean inde-
pendence. Crimea Suspends Plans for Independence Referendum, Reuter Libr. Rep.,
July 9, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, LBYRPT file.
30 An example is Rhodesia and Nyasaland. See supra note 13. This public property
was dispersed throughout the territories of all of the successors, and not located in
just one successor state, as the Fleet is located only within Ukrainian territory.
31 Other CIS members were angry that Russia and Ukraine did not follow the
established CIS procedures for decision making in reaching the Black Sea Fleet
agreement. See infra note 40.
32 Ukrainian President Criticizes Russia as U.N. Heir, Reuter Libr. Rep., May
11, 1992.
33 The Act of Proclamation of Ukrainian Independence declares everything on
Ukraine territory to be the property of its people. Ukrainian Republican Party
Opposed to Black Sea Fleet Agreement, BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts, Aug.
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Ukraine appears to have a stronger claim because the Fleet is stationed
on Ukrainian territory. Additionally, Ukraine does not have to honor
Russian claims to predecessor property in Ukrainian territory since
Ukraine has not recognized Russia as the de jure successor state to
the Soviet Union.14 Russia's claims to Fleet ownership would be
strengthened greatly, however, if it is determined that the Fleet ac-
tually is on Russian territory because Kruschev's 1954 transfer of
Crimea from Russia to Ukraine is void.35 The Black Sea Fleet Agree-
ment to jointly control the Fleet avoids the difficulty of determining
which republic has the more legitimate claim to sole ownership, but
it does not resolve the underlying question of which republic will
emerge as the sole successor state.
At the present, it appears that Ukraine may prevail as the successor
state. After 1995, Russia can no longer use the joint control of the
Fleet as a justification for Russian access to the Crimean port because
Russia will have its own navy stationed at its own ports.36 Absent
this justification, it is unlikely that Ukraine will continue to permit
Russia to use this port, since Ukraine, a strong proponent of sov-
ereignty, vehemently has objected to any invasion of its territory by
the other republics.3 7 If Ukraine successfully excludes Russia from
the port, Russian influence in the Mediterranean will decrease as
Ukrainian influence rises.38 As a result, Russia's importance as an
international figure may decrease, leaving Ukraine to gain world
recognition as the successor to the Soviet Union.39
8, 1992, at Su/1454/C1/1, available in LEXIS, World Library, BBC subfile (sum-
marizing Ukrainian Television Broadcast, Aug. 4, 1992). Ukraine maintains that
Russian control over a Fleet based in Ukrainian territory would be an impermissible
violation of Ukrainian sovereignty. Id. The December 21, 1991 Agreement stated
that CIS members would "recognize and respect each other's territorial integrity
and the inviolability of existing borders." CIS Agreement, supra note 1.
1, Under the CIS Agreements, all the republics are to be treated equally and no
sole successor is named. See CIS Agreement, supra note 1; see also supra text
accompanying notes 14-16.
31 See supra note 7.
16 See supra note 8.
17 Ukraine has proclaimed its independence as a sovereign republic. See supra
note 33. Ukraine also took steps to further its sovereignty by pursuing a policy
aimed at keeping the Commonwealth a weak confederation by opposing attempts
to create permanent CIS coordinating structures and blocking efforts to build a
central CIS bureaucracy. See Karatnycky, supra note 5, at 91.
11 The Mediterranean is a key area for a republic to exercise its geopolitical
influence. See supra note 7.
39 Id.
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In addition to delaying the determination of the successor state,
the Black Sea Fleet Agreement threatens CIS stability. Russia and
Ukraine violated the CIS Agreement with the Black Sea Fleet Agree-
ment because they did not consult the other CIS members in reaching
their decision to jointly control the Fleet/ ° Consequently, they have
antagonized the other CIS republics by acting outside of proscribed
CIS methods and by denying the republics part of the Fleet to use
to develop their respective navies.4 1 Furthermore, if Ukraine rises in
international stature and replaces Russia as the accepted successor
state to the Soviet Union, the other CIS republics may no longer
view the CIS arrangement as advantageous for them, thereby prompt-
ing its dissolution. 42
Finally, the Russian-Ukrainian Agreement to divide the Black Sea
Fleet undermines the security of the CIS by setting a dangerous
precedent to divide other components of the Soviet military. Because
Russia and Ukraine both intend to develop their own armed forces,
using the Black Sea Fleet as a basis,4 other republics will be en-
couraged to divide Soviet equipment amongst themselves to develop
their own forces." Currently, it would be extremely difficult for each
40 On January 17, 1992, CIS leaders met in Moscow and created a commission
to resolve problems relating to the future of the Black Sea Fleet. The commission
included representatives of Russia, Ukraine, and the Armed Forces Command. Ex-
Soviet Military in Confusion, Distress, Vasily Kononenko, CURRENT DIG. SOVIET
PRESS, Feb. 19, 1992, at 1. Issues of common interest for the member republics,
such as strategic armed forces, were to be presented to the Council for approval.
CIS Coordinating Bodies Agreement, supra note 1. When the Russian/Ukrainian
Agreement was announced, the Republic of Belarus was not pleased because the
Agreement had not been presented to the Council of Heads of States for approval.
The Chairman of the Presidium of the Belarus Parliament stressed that his country,
as well as Russia and Ukraine, had participated in building the Black Sea Fleet,
and that the property ownership of the Fleet needed to be resolved by the CIS
members. Valery Kovalev, Byelarus Disagrees with Yalta Agreements on Black Sea
Fleet Division, Sovm PRESS DIG., Aug. 11, 1992.
" Other successor states (who contributed to maintaining military forces under
a federation of states) have shared military forces equally when the federation of
states dissolved and no sole successor was recognized. See supra note 13.
42 In forming the CIS, the member republics were more concerned about internal
threats from fellow republics than they were about external threats from other
countries. Many of the smaller republics did not want a Russian dominated coalition,
and they agreed to the CIS arrangement because Ukraine was uniquely positioned
to counterbalance Russia. Since the republics were so against a Russian dominated
CIS, it is unlikely that they would accept an Ukrainian dominated CIS any easier.
See Karatnycky, supra note 5, at 105.
43 See supra note 8.
" For example, the Soviet Union spent $400 billion over 40 years to develop a
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republic to maintain independent armed forces capable of successfully
repelling a military attack. 5 In such a situation, the entire CIS will
be placed at risk of invasion because none of the republics will have
a military capable of withstanding attack. Additionally, it is unlikely
that the republics will coordinate military efforts because each is
concerned with becoming an independent, sovereign nation. Conse-
quently, the CIS will be ripe for an invasion if each republic tries
to maintain separate forces. 46
A vulnerable CIS also threatens international stability. The Persian
Gulf War underscored the fact that the United States is not unilaterally
able to perform the function of world policeman. Instead, the war
demonstrated the need for a new international security system based
on multipolarity.4 7 If the CIS does not emerge as a stable power in
the system because its members compete with each other, and it is
vulnerable to military attacks, a serious power vacuum will emerge,
making it difficult to establish a new, stable balance of power. 4
A better solution to the Black Sea Fleet crisis would be to continue
CIS command of the Fleet indefinitely. 49 Under this arrangement,
complex air-defense network and military satellite assets. Adams, supra note 7.
Ukraine and several of the other republics want to develop their own territorial air
defense system by appropriating former Soviet equipment stationed in their territory.
Id. According to military experts, none of the republics has the financial capacity
to build a competent air-defense network. Id. Furthermore, the entire CIS would
be jeopardized by splitting up the system because no republic would be capable of
ascertaining when a nuclear attack was imminent. Id.
41 For example, if Azerbaijan intends to maintain its own forces (experts believe
that there are four motorized infantry divisions, thirty fighter planes, 100 attack
planes, and a naval base in Azerbaijan), military specialists predict that the absence
of specialists, servicing, maintenance, facilities and spare parts provided by a unified
effort of the republics will make Azerbaijan's combat equipment and arms of the
ground forces unusable in a year's time. A. Dokuchayev, Only Unified Forces Can
Offer safety from Aggression, CUR. DIG. Sov. PRESS, Feb. 12, 1992, at 11. Experts
point out that Iraq, even with all its petrodollars, has been unable to create an up-
to-date army capable of successful defense. Id.
" See supra notes 44 and 45.
41 A multipolar balance of power has proved very difficult to maintain historically.
Both world wars of the twentieth century resulted from major disruptions in the
multipolar balance of power. Sergei Rogov, International Security and the Collapse
of the Soviet Union, WASH. Q., Spring 1992, 15, 20.
" By definition, a multipolar balance requires several powers to counterbalance
one another. If no strong power emerges to replace the Soviet Union, a vaccuum
will exist in Eurasia that will disrupt the current multipolar balance. One possible
consequence of the lack of a stable, multipolar balance of powers is that Germany
and Japan might be propelled to acquire nuclear weapons, an act that would further
imperil the tenuous balance of power. Id. at 20.
- This solution would disrupt Ukraine's quest to become an independent sovereign
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CIS stability would be promoted because a unified armed forces could
defeat an attack more effectively than the divided republican forces.5°
A strong CIS also would promote international stability by replacing
the USSR, thereby maintaining the post Cold War multipolar balance
of power.5 Furthermore, unified command of the Fleet will provide
all countries who contributed to its maintenance the benefit of its
protection and a voice in its control of the Fleet.12 Finally, with
unified command, the situation will not exist where two republics,
neither of whom is a successor to the predecessor state, seize control
of an important strategic force to the detriment of the entire CIS.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Russian-Ukrainian Agreement to share control of the Black
Sea Fleet until 1995 does not end the controversy between Russia
and Ukraine to gain recognition as the sole successor to the Soviet
Union and is a strong step forward in undermining the stability of
the CIS. The plan to divide the Fleet between Russia and Ukraine
leaves the door open for Ukraine to assume control of the Black Sea
Port and to assume a role of international importance, possibly even
to replace Russia as the recognized successor to the Soviet Union.
Russia and Ukraine's moves to create separate, republican armed
forces threaten CIS security, because no republic can afford to main-
tain an up-to-date military capable of providing successful defense.
Russia and Ukraine also have isolated the CIS members who were
not consulted in reaching the decision to remove the Black Sea Fleet
nation, as it would have to rely on the other republics for military defense. See
supra note 33. This suggestion also might be impalatable to other CIS republics,
who fear a Russian dominated CIS. See supra note 42. Russia would have the
opportunity to exert a great deal of influence in CIS policy with a unified military
since the Soviet Union placed most of its military apparatus in Russia. See supra
note 44.
10 See supra notes 44, 45 and accompanying text.
5' See supra notes 47 and 48.
32 The most important factors in setting a policy to resolve property claims are
fairness, predictability, stability, and the public interest. To promote the stability
of the unified German state, the new government decided to try to compensate as
many East German families who had their property taken by the East German
Government as possible. Jeffress, supra note 11, at 528. By analogy, the CIS members
should not be deprived of their property rights in the Black Sea Fleet. Each con-
tributed to the maintenance of the Fleet, and the public interest, fairness, and the
stability of the regime all favor their continued enjoyment provided from the pro-
tection of the Fleet.
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from CIS command, an issue that surely was of common interest to
all CIS members. Without some revision of the Agreement to put
the Fleet back under CIS command before division of the Fleet in
1995, the CIS may be headed for possible dissolution and the inter-
national balance of power may be headed towards a crisis.
Kendall Butterworth

